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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked in this interlocutory appeal to decide 
whether the owner of a piece of land is liable for the costs of 
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an environmental cleanup that took place there before the 
owner acquired it.  Our answer is yes. 
 
Trainer Custom Chemical, LLC (“Trainer”) acquired a 
property known as the Stoney Creek Site (the “Site”) for 
$20,000, after Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental 
Protection (“PADEP”) had already incurred over $818,000 in 
environmental cleanup costs at the Site.  The cleanup costs 
continued to mount following Trainer’s acquisition of the 
property, both because of pre-existing pollution and because 
buildings on the Site were demolished by one or both of 
Trainer’s principals, Jeremy Hunter and James Halkias, which 
caused further contamination. 
 
PADEP sued Trainer, Hunter, and Halkias for 
violations of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-28,1 and Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup 
Act (“HSCA”), 35 Pa. Stat. §§ 6020.101-.1305, and sought to 
recover all of its response costs related to the Site, regardless 
of when those costs arose.  At summary judgment, the 
District Court drew a temporal line, holding Trainer liable 
under both statutes for the response costs incurred after 
Trainer took ownership of the Site but not for the costs that 
arose before.  Although the Court directed the parties to 
proceed to trial on damages, PADEP disagreed with the 
temporal distinction drawn by the Court and filed this 
interlocutory appeal. 
 
                                              
1 CERCLA § 1 et seq. is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 
et seq. 
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We conclude that a current owner of real property is 
liable under both CERCLA and HSCA for all response costs 
in an environmental cleanup, including costs incurred before 
the owner acquired the property.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Facts 
 
1. The Site Before Trainer Acquired It 
 
The Site is located in Trainer Borough, Delaware 
County, Pennsylvania.  In 2007, it was owned by Stoney 
Creek Technologies (“SCT”), which primarily used it for 
making corrosion inhibitors, fuel additives, and oil additives.  
Buildings and equipment used in creating SCT’s products 
were located on the Site, including a laboratory and a water 
treatment facility.  SCT also kept various hazardous 
substances at the Site, including about three million gallons of 
flammable or combustible chemicals that posed a threat of 
release, and over seventeen million pounds of other chemical 
inventory, which included flammable, combustible, and 
corrosive chemicals.   
 
PADEP investigated the environmental risk at the Site 
and determined in 2007 that “there is a release or threat of 
release of hazardous substances or contaminants, which 
presents a substantial danger to human health or the 
environment[.]”  (App. at 34.)  Accordingly, PADEP and the 
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United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
initiated removal actions.2   
 
SCT was in financial trouble and could not afford the 
expenses involved in the cleanup.  One such expense was for 
the electricity to power pollution control and security 
equipment, including a vaporized nitrogen system.  The 
nitrogen system was necessary to minimize the threat of fire 
posed by the flammable and combustible chemicals on the 
Site.  Due to lack of payment, the power company was going 
to shut off the electricity to the Site, so PADEP assumed 
responsibility for paying the electrical bills.   
 
2. Trainer’s Acquisition of the Site 
 
The same financial straits that had apparently led SCT 
to fall behind in paying for electricity also led it to become 
delinquent in paying real estate taxes.  Consequently, the Tax 
Claim Bureau of Delaware County forced a sale of the Site.  
In what was evidently a coordinated effort, Hunter and 
                                              
2  Generally, “removal actions are short term responses 
to a release or threat of release while remedial actions involve 
long term remedies.”  Black Horse Lane Assoc., L.P. v. Dow 
Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 293 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation 
omitted).  “The statute defines ‘response’ as ‘remove, 
removal, remedy, and remedial action[.]’”  Id. at 292 (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(25)).  The record contains some 
inconsistency as to when removal actions at the Site began.  
For example, one report indicates that the EPA began its 
response in October 2008.  Nevertheless, it is undisputed that 
removal actions commenced before Trainer became the 
owner of the Site.   
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Halkias purchased the property and put its title in Trainer’s 
name.  Hunter signed the purchase agreement, the recitals of 
which plainly stated that the Site had ongoing “environmental 
issues ... [and] environmental remediation.”  (App. at 53.)  
Despite that warning, on October 4, 2012, Halkias tendered a 
cashier’s check for $20,000 and a handwritten note indicating 
that the deed to the property should be made out to Trainer 
Custom Chemical LLC.  The next day, Halkias and Hunter 
officially formed Trainer Custom Chemical LLC by filing a 
Certificate of Organization with the Pennsylvania Department 
of State.  On October 9, 2012, the deed to the Site was 
executed and put in Trainer’s name.   
 
3. The Site After Trainer Acquired It 
 
The EPA and PADEP completed their removal actions 
at the Site on December 12,  2012.3  But that was not the end 
of the problems there.  After Trainer acquired the Site, either 
Hunter or Halkias or both – they point the finger of blame at 
each other – demolished many of the Site’s structures.  
Regardless of who was responsible, it is undisputed that 
metals and other salvageable materials reclaimed from the 
Site were sold for at least $875,000 to JK Myers Contracting, 
a business that Halkias had registered with the Pennsylvania 
Corporations Bureau in April 2012.   
 
                                              
3 There is some ambiguity in the record on the date of 
completion.  PADEP’s reply brief notes December 10, 2012 
as the date of completion, but an EPA website referenced in 
the briefing indicates the date to be May 2, 2013.  The 
discrepancy is immaterial to this case. 
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 In June 2014, PADEP received two reports assessing 
environmental concerns at the Site.  One noted that “[t]he 
[]EPA has acknowledged that hazards still exist at the Site[.]”  
(App. at 61.)  The report further said that, during a recent visit 
to the Site, PADEP “observed active demolition activities 
being conducted on several structures throughout the Site[,]” 
and “[s]everal storage tanks were observed to be cut open and 
unknown contents were noted to be spilling onto the ground.”  
(App. at 62.)  The other report indicated that buildings on the 
Site had asbestos-containing materials that needed to be 
removed before demolition.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
PADEP sued Trainer, Halkias, and Hunter under 
CERCLA and HSCA to recover the costs incurred in cleaning 
up the Site.  The complaint was in six counts: separate ones 
against each of the three defendants under CERCLA § 107(a), 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), and, again, separate ones against each of 
them under HSCA §§ 701 and 702, 35 Pa. Stat. §§ 6020.701, 
6020.702.   
 
Eventually, PADEP moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that the defendants should be jointly and severally 
liable for all of the environmental response costs.  In total, 
those costs were $932,580.12, through November 2015.  The 
most significant charges were payments for electricity 
amounting to $818,730.50 through June 2009, before Trainer 
acquired the Site.  PADEP also bore other response costs after 
Trainer took ownership.   
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in part 
and denied it in part.  The Court noted that PADEP’s claims 
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against Halkias and Hunter were based on a theory of 
piercing Trainer’s corporate veil, so the initial question it 
sought to answer, and the question before us in this 
interlocutory appeal, is whether Trainer was liable for 
violations of CERCLA and HSCA.  With respect to CERCLA 
liability, “the Court [held] [Trainer] liable for any response 
costs incurred after [Trainer] took ownership of the Site, but 
not for costs incurred beforehand.”  (App. at 99-100.)  As to 
CERCLA damages, it denied summary judgment because 
there was a genuine dispute of material fact concerning the 
amount of damages for which Trainer was liable.  The Court 
reached the same conclusions with respect to HSCA liability 
and damages.   
 
PADEP disagreed with the District Court’s decision to 
grant summary judgment only in part.  It sought an order 
certifying for interlocutory appeal the issue of whether federal 
and Pennsylvania law “make an owner liable for response 
actions and response costs attributable to an identified release 
of hazardous substances which continues at the time of that 
person’s ownership, regardless of when such actions or 
response costs were taken or incurred.”  (App. at 114-15.)  
The District Court granted certification, and PADEP then 
petitioned us for permission to appeal, which we gave 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).   
 
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
 
A. CERCLA 
 
“Congress enacted CERCLA ‘to promote the timely 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs 
of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for 
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the contamination.’”  Litgo N.J. Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 378 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 
599, 602 (2009)).  Section 107(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA gives 
states “the right to recover costs incurred in cleaning up a 
waste site from ‘potentially responsible parties’ (PRPs)—four 
broad classes of persons who may be held strictly liable for 
releases of hazardous substances that occur at a facility.”  
Litgo N.J. Inc., 725 F.3d at 378.  Those four classes of PRPs 
are: the owner or operator of a facility, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(1);  anyone who owned or operated the facility 
when there was a disposal of a hazardous substance, id. 
§ 9607(a)(2); anyone who arranged for the disposal or 
treatment, or arranged for the transport for disposal or 
treatment, of hazardous substances at the facility, id. 
§ 9607(a)(3); and anyone who accepted hazardous substances 
for transport to sites selected by such persons, id. 
§ 9607(a)(4).  United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 
706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996).  “Once an entity is identified as a 
PRP, it may be compelled to ... reimburse the [g]overnment 
for ... past and future response costs.”  Burlington, 556 U.S. at 
609. 
 
 Our focus here is on the first category of PRPs: “the 
owner ... of ... a facility[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1); accord 
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 210 (3d Cir. 
1988).  We refer to that category of PRP in this appeal as 
simply the “owner,” or, more particularly, the “current 
owner.”4  CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 713. 
                                              
4  While CERCLA does not use the word “current” as 
a modifier for “owner,” we have held that § 107(a)(1) 
includes “current owners” as potentially responsible parties.  
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In § 107 cost recovery actions, summary judgment on 
the issue of liability may be appropriate “even when genuine 
issues of material fact remain as to ... damages.”  United 
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 
1993) (“Alcan 1993”).  Defendants may be held jointly and 
severally liable in a cost recovery action, United States v. 
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“Alcan-Butler”), but they can also seek to limit that liability 
by demonstrating that the contamination “is divisible and 
reasonably capable of apportionment[,]” id. at 269; accord 
Alcan 1993, 990 F.2d at 721-23.5 
                                                                                                     
See, e.g.,  Litgo, 725 F.3d at 381; CDMG Realty Co. 96 F.3d 
at 713.  And although the statute uses the language “owner 
and operator[,]” stated in the conjunctive, many courts have 
concluded that the language should be read in the disjunctive.  
See e.g., Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 
F.3d 321, 328 (2d Cir. 2000) (“It is settled in this circuit that 
owner and operator liability should be treated separately.”); 
Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. 
Living Tr., 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Like other 
courts, we read these categories [of ‘owner’ and ‘operator’] in 
the disjunctive.”).  We too have described § 107(a)(1) in 
disjunctive language.  See CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 713 
(stating a “current owner or operator of a facility” is a PRP). 
 
5  There is some disagreement in the case law over 
whether divisibility is properly addressed at the liability phase 
or damages phase of a cost recovery action.  We have said 
that it is best to resolve a divisibility inquiry “at the initial 
liability phase” because “it involves precisely relative degrees 
of liability[,]” Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 270 n.29, but the 
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B. HSCA 
 
HSCA is Pennsylvania’s state law counterpart to 
CERCLA.  Cf. In re Joshua Hill, Inc., 294 F.3d 482, 489-91 
(3d Cir. 2002) (supporting analysis of HSCA claims by 
relying on analogous CERCLA provisions).  Like CERCLA, 
HSCA defines classes of persons who are legally liable for a 
release or threatened release of hazardous substances, and the 
owner of a contaminated site is one such person.  35 Pa. Stat. 
§ 6020.701(a).  A current owner is strictly liable for 
environmental response costs, including those incurred by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Id. § 6020.702(a).  
Although CERCLA and HSCA have differences, there are 
instances in which “liability under ... HSCA mirrors liability 
under CERCLA” because “§ 702(a) of ... HSCA mirrors 
§ 107(a) of CERCLA.”  Agere Sys., Inc. v. Adv. Envtl. Tech. 
Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 236 (3d Cir. 2010).  In this matter, no 
one asserts that owner liability under CERCLA § 107(a) and 
under HSCA §§ 701 and 702 is anything other than 
                                                                                                     
Second Circuit has questioned that approach, see Alcan 1993, 
990 F.2d at 723 (stating that approach “may be contrary to the 
statutory dictates of CERCLA” and instead leaving the choice 
of when to address divisibility “to the sound discretion of the 
trial court”).  We do not attempt to resolve that disagreement 
now, however, because no party raised it before the District 
Court or to us on appeal.  We simply note that nothing we say 
here with respect to current owner liability under § 107(a)(1) 
is meant to change our precedent addressing divisibility in a 
§ 107 cost recovery action. 
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practically the same for all relevant purposes.6  Therefore, our 
resolution of Trainer’s liability under CERCLA also decides 
Trainer’s liability under HSCA. 
 
III. DISCUSSION7 
 
At the outset, we note that all parties and the District 
Court agree that Trainer is the owner of the Site and, pursuant 
to CERCLA § 107(a)(1), is at least liable for environmental 
                                              
6  Our decision today does not imply that relevant 
distinctions may not emerge in other cases, but no relevant 
difference has been suggested to us here.  
  
7  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  “The 
scope of our review in a permitted interlocutory appeal is 
limited to questions of law raised by the underlying order.  
We are not limited to answering the questions certified, 
however, and may address any issue necessary to decide the 
appeal.”  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
“We review the grant or denial of a motion for 
summary judgment de novo,” id., and “apply[] the same 
standard employed by the district court[,]” Trinity Indus., Inc. 
v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2013).  
“Summary judgment is appropriate only if, after drawing all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,” 
which in this case is Trainer, “there exists ‘no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact.’”  Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Greenlease 
Holding Co., --- F.3d ---, No. 16-1994, 2018 WL 4324261, at 
*19 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 2018) (citation omitted). 
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response costs incurred after it took ownership.  Taking that 
concession as our starting point, our task is to decide whether 
the meaning of “all costs” in § 107(a) includes response costs 
incurred before Trainer acquired the Site.  We conclude that, 
given the structure and text of CERCLA, a current owner 
under § 107(a)(1) is indeed liable for all response costs, 
whether incurred before or after acquiring the property. 
 
“Statutory interpretation, as we always say, begins 
with the text.”  Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 424-25 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 
1856 (2016)).  We derive the “legislative intent of Congress 
... from the language and structure of the statute itself[.]”  
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997).  We 
therefore begin our analysis by looking at the text of the 
CERCLA provision that makes a current owner liable for 
response costs and then consider that provision’s place within 
the larger framework of the statute. 
 
Section 107(a) provides that “the owner ... of ... a 
facility ... shall be liable for ... all costs of removal or 
remedial action incurred by ... a State ... not inconsistent with 
the national contingency plan[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); 
accord Nicolet, 857 F.2d at 210.  That is a statement of 
remarkable breadth, but a statute may be broad in scope and 
still be quite clear.  See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 
F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 7, 2010).  
The term “all costs” means just that; it does not distinguish 
between costs that were incurred before ownership and those 
incurred afterwards.  Because there is no such distinction, 
there is no temporal limitation on the liability for costs.  If 
Congress had intended for “all costs” to mean anything less 
than “all,” we assume it would have so specified.  The plain 
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text thus leads us to conclude that the words “all costs” 
include costs incurred before ownership and costs incurred 
after ownership. 
 
The structure of CERCLA, as amended, reinforces that 
reading of the statute.  “The Supreme Court has stated 
consistently that the text of a statute must be considered in the 
larger context or structure of the statute in which it is found.”  
United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2006).  
And “[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain 
exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are 
not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary 
legislative intent.”  TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 
(2001) (citation omitted).  CERCLA already provides a 
number of potential limits on PRP liability.  There are statutes 
of limitations for § 107 cost recovery actions, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(g)(2),8 the innocent owner defense to § 107(a) 
liability, id. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3); CDMG Realty Co., 
96 F.3d at 716 & n.6,9 and the bona fide prospective 
                                              
8  An initial cost recovery action under § 107 “must be 
commenced ... for a removal action, within 3 years after 
completion of the removal action, ... and ... for a  remedial 
action, within 6 years after initiation of physical on-site 
construction of the remedial action[.]”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(g)(2). 
 
9  “To establish the innocent owner defense, the 
defendant must show that ‘the real property on which the 
facility is located was acquired by the defendant after the 
disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at 
the facility’ and that ‘[a]t the time the defendant acquired the 
facility the defendant did not know and had no reason to 
15 
purchaser defense to § 107(a)(1) current owner liability, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601(40), 9607(r).10  We therefore decline to read 
an additional limitation into the statute by imposing a new 
temporal frame on the meaning of “all” in the term “all 
costs.” 
 
Moreover, the provision in CERCLA for contribution 
actions, § 113(f), also supports reading “all costs” to include 
costs incurred before a current owner acquired a property.  Id. 
§ 9613(f).  Through § 113(f), response costs can be 
reassigned to a more culpable party.  Id.; see Litgo N.J. Inc., 
725 F.3d at 383 (“After identifying PRPs, courts allocate 
response costs based on equitable factors.”).  When 
                                                                                                     
know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the 
release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the 
facility.’”  CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 716 & n.6 
(alteration in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 
9607(b)(3)). 
 
10  A bona fide prospective purchaser is one who, 
among other things, has “made all appropriate inquiries into 
the previous ownership and uses of the facility” and 
“exercises appropriate care with respect to hazardous 
substances found at the facility[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 9601(40).  
Such a purchaser “shall not be liable” as “an owner or 
operator of a facility” under § 107(a)(1) “as long as [it] does 
not impede the performance of a response action or natural 
resource restoration.”  Id. § 9607(r)(1).  The statute further 
provides that, even if a new owner qualifies as a bona fide 
prospective purchaser, the new owner would not be entitled to 
a windfall profit.  Id. § 9607(r)(2)-(3). 
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apportioning cleanup costs, courts consistently pay attention 
to who has participated in response efforts without slowing or 
interfering with that process.  See, e.g., id. at 383, 388-89 
(citing cases when cooperative PRP current owners were 
apportioned 0%, 5%, and 10% of remediation costs).  Thus, 
when a PRP must bear “more than its fair share” of cleanup 
costs resulting from a § 107 cost recovery action, it can seek a 
more equitable distribution of those costs through a 
contribution action against other PRPs.  United States v. R.W. 
Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506-08 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 
Finally, the Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 
115 Stat. 2356 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607), 
provides logical support for the conclusion that a current 
owner is liable for response costs incurred before the change 
in ownership of the property.11  As just noted, see supra note 
8, Congress added a provision from that Act – the bona fide 
prospective purchaser defense – to CERCLA to allow a 
prospective purchaser to be exempted from § 107(a)(1) 
liability, if that purchaser, among other requirements, “made 
all appropriate inquiries into the previous ownership and uses 
of the facility” and “exercise[d] appropriate care with respect 
to hazardous substances found at the facility[.]”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(40).  But that defense is limited because even a 
careful prospective purchaser is not totally off the hook – the 
amendment allows the United States to obtain a lien on the 
property for its “unrecovered response costs.”  Id. 
                                              
11  The District Court noted in its order certifying the 
interlocutory appeal that the bona fide prospective purchaser 
defense “might support [PADEP]’s position.”  (App. at 157 
(emphasis omitted).) 
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§ 9607(r)(2).  No one has invoked the defense here, and, in 
any event, it allows only the United States to obtain a lien, 
while in this instance Pennsylvania is the one seeking to 
recover response costs.  Nevertheless, that provision, by its 
very existence, indicates that Congress contemplated 
scenarios in which a current owner could be liable for 
response costs incurred before ownership transferred. 
 
Therefore, based on CERCLA’s text and structure, the 
meaning of “all costs” in § 107(a) includes costs incurred 
both before and after a current owner acquired the property.12  
                                              
12  The District Court concluded otherwise based on 
California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. 
Hearthside Residential Corp., 613 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2010), 
but that decision gives no guidance as to the meaning of “all 
costs” in § 107(a).  Rather, the Hearthside court addressed 
which of two entities was a current owner of a property for 
purposes of § 107(a)(1).  613 F.3d at 911-12.  One was a 
corporation that had owned the property while all cleanup 
costs were incurred, and the other was the state’s land 
commission that owned the property at the time the lawsuit 
was filed but not at any time when costs had been incurred.  
Id. at 912.  The court held that an owner of a property at the 
time cleanup costs are incurred cannot avoid liability for such 
costs by selling the property prior to the filing or initiation of 
a response action by the government and, therefore, that the 
party who owned the property at issue at the time the cleanup 
costs were incurred was a responsible party.  Id. at 911, 916.  
Hearthside does not stand for the proposition that it is 
permissible to temporally partition § 107(a)(1) liability with 
respect to cleanup costs.  Here, because Trainer “[did] not 
dispute that [it], as the owner and operator of the Site, [was] a 
18 
As mentioned at the outset, that means that Trainer is liable 
for the removal costs at the Site regardless of when those 
costs were incurred.  And because we conclude that Trainer is 
liable under CERCLA, we also conclude that it is liable under 
HSCA.  See supra Section II.B.13 
                                                                                                     
responsible party under CERCLA[,]” (App. at 94); see supra 
Section III, there was no need to turn to Hearthside to 
determine again whether Trainer was a current owner of the 
Site. 
 
13  Specifically, as under CERCLA, there is no 
ambiguity under HSCA that Trainer is liable for all response 
costs, including those incurred prior to its ownership.  First, 
Trainer is a “responsible person” because it “own[ed] or 
operate[d] the site” (1) “when a hazardous substance [wa]s 
placed or [came] to be located in or on the site,” 
§ 6020.701(a)(1)(i), or (2) “during the time of the release or 
threatened release,” id. § 60020.701(a)(1)(iii).  There were 
hazardous substances located on the site at the time Trainer 
took ownership and there has been a release or threatened 
release since that time.  Second, a responsible person is 
“strictly liable for response costs and damages which result 
from the release or threatened release of hazardous 
substances,” id. § 6020.702(a), which includes “[r]easonable 
and necessary or appropriate costs of remedial response 
incurred by the United States [or] the Commonwealth.” id. 
§ 6020.702(a)(2).  Here, PADEP has incurred “[r]easonable 
and necessary or appropriate costs of remedial response,” id. 
§ 6020.702(a)(2), resulting from the release or threatened 
release.  Third, exceptions to responsible party status do not 
apply because at least one of the defendants knew or had 
reason to know “a hazardous substance which is the subject 
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Nothing in our decision today regarding liability for 
“all costs” is meant to affect established precedent concerning 
CERCLA damages.  How exactly damages are assessed 
against or apportioned among PRPs in any particular case is a 
matter to be decided according to existing statutory and 
decisional law. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, 
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s order that Trainer is liable under 
CERCLA and HSCA for PADEP’s response costs incurred 
after it acquired the Site, but we will vacate the District 
Court’s order with respect to Trainer’s liability for PADEP’s 
response costs incurred before acquisition of the Site.  Given 
that disposition, we do not need to address the remaining 
aspects of the District Court’s decision.  The matter is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
                                                                                                     
of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or 
at the site.” id.§ 6020.701(b)(vi)(A). 
